#surveillancecapitalism

joebraun@diasp.org

The world’s #liberal democracies now confront a tragedy of the #un-commons.” #Information spaces that people assume to be #public are strictly ruled by #private #commercial interests for maximum #profit. The internet as a self-regulating #market has been revealed as a failed experiment. #Surveillancecapitalism leaves a trail of social wreckage in its wake: the wholesale destruction of #privacy, the intensification of social #inequality, the poisoning of social discourse with #defactualized information, the demolition of social norms and the weakening of #democratic institutions.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/12/opinion/facebook-privacy.html
#facebook #extraction

hankg@social.isurf.ca

Legit question: does Tik Tok have the same algorithmic amplification and silo effects as Facebook and Twitter and if so what is their excuse for allowing that to happen since their system rose after the dysfunctions with it were apparent? #surveillancecapitalism

dredmorbius@joindiaspora.com

An interesting response to Twitter's staged rollout of "you must be logged in to view tweets" surveillance misfeature ... would be for sites to ban Twitter links

For the backstory see:
https://old.reddit.com/r/DataHoarder/comments/pa6dra/twitter_starts_to_require_login_to_view_tweets/

I've been having that discussion with one popular tech discussion forum. They're considering the option.

On Reddit, such a block could be implemented individually by mods of key forums, as well as by Reddit admins themselves.

On the Fediverse and Diaspora, instance and pod admins can ban links to Twitter, or rewrite those to go through other interfaces (#Nitter and #Threadreader being the most viable presently).

And of course Facebook could do this, though given current Antitrust scrutiny, this might not be warmly embraced.

Note that the audience isn't merely Twitter, but those who rely on Twitter to spread messages and outreach. Given Twitter's relatively small direct userbase, the extended reach of links matters strongly. Breaking that reach kills Twitter's use value.

#twitter #surveillance #SurveillanceCapitalism #boycott

dredmorbius@joindiaspora.com

US Domestic Surveillance Disclosures pre-dating Edward Snowden's Revelations

Asking for sources of any current activities met with some resistance at HN. Challenged for any awareness of pre-Snowden programmes, I listed a few I was aware of, off the top of my head:

Regards pre-Snowden, the situation was far more than an "open secret", there were multiple documented projects and methods employed. Among them:

There were very strong suspicions around the TIA (total information awareness) and USA PATRIOT ACT (2003, 2001). I recall much chatter about this at the time, and the related FISA court, though little by way of specific details of technological measures and methods involved.

Carnivore, a WinNT workstation-based tool, disclosed ~2000. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnivore_(software)

There are telephnic data retention programmes, including MAINWAY (revealed in 2006), containing an estimated over 1.9 trillion call-detail records, and

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAINWAY

Project ECHELON, with disclosures of varying aspects from 1972 -- 2000. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON

There are earlier periods, notably addressed by the FBI's own COINTELPRO archives (https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro), though for my purposes I'm considering "modern" projects to be circa 1990 onwards. (COINTELPRO and the Church Committee hearings resulted in substantial changes, at least publically, to US domestic surveillance).

And I've compiled a long list of pre-1990 references of concerns regarding significant technologists who'd warned of the risks of information technology as a tool of surveillance and control, largely as no such list seemed extant: https://toot.cat/@dredmorbius/105074933053020193

I'm well aware that documentation of clandestine and national security issues is difficult to come by, see the TK case for one reason why that is.

But that's also why specific documentation is so valuable and why I'd requested that.


Adapted from an HN comment:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27184956 )

#surveillance #SurveillanceState #SurveillanceCapitalism #NSA #CIA #FBI #Carnivore #ECHELON #PatriotAct #FISA #MAINWAY #Room614A #ATT #MarkKlein #WilliamBinney #RussellTice #Hemisphere #EdwardSnowden #COINTELPRO #ChurchCommittee

dredmorbius@joindiaspora.com

We've been thinking about it wrong: The norm has been Insecurity by obscurity

The Crypto AG CIA backdoor story (2020) clarifies to me much of the neverending flood of "outlaw strong crypto" thinkpieces and "lawful access" (a/k/a mandated backdoors) proposals.

I realised today that the whole #SecurityByObscurity discussion was missing a major insight: For much of the Cold War period, the operational standard has been instead #InsecurityByObscurity

Crypto AG was an allegedly secure system which was, obscure to the public, insecure. And that insecurity (along with fear, suprise, ruthless efficiency, and an almost fanatical devotion to the Pope), seems to have been a key element of US and #FiveEyes surveillance capabilities from the 1950s onward. (I'm aware Crypto AG's role under the CIA begain ~1970.) More recent stories of package intercepts (where backdoors are installed on specific equipment), zero-day hacks (such as are routinely purchased and exploited by Cellebrite, Palantir, the NSO Group, and others, is the logical extension of Crypto AG methods. As is putting a surveillance device in the pockets of the population that the surveillance targets themselves fight amongst themselves to buy.

Our information systems, technology, devices, and infrastructure are, obscure to us, insecure. And we fall for it again and again.

Because while the cryptography of the NSA and Five Eyes, as well as their counterparts worldwide, is no doubt prodigious, the cheapest way to break through a wall is to go around it. By far.

And virtually all the continuous whinging since the early 1990s about the hazards of emerging strong crypto makes vastly more sense in this context. The agencies know their own strengths, weaknesses, and secret weapons. And have been trying to preserve their advantage. (Even though this ultimately puts us all at vastly greater risk.) Their policy recommendations have been premised on this, even if they've been unwilling to admit this publicly.

But yeah, insecurity by obscurity as an operational norm. Describes much of the present Web as well.


Adapted from an earlier Mastodon thread: https://mastodon.social/@natecull/106112437055287730

#CryptoAG #security #surveillance #surveillanceCapitalism #surveillanceState #infosec #infotech