https://www.bitchute.com/video/WUUW2FDq67uC/
#mac #address #chipped #sheeple on the way to hell
The Covid Vaccine IS the Mark of the Beast
1 Comments
https://www.bitchute.com/video/WUUW2FDq67uC/
#mac #address #chipped #sheeple on the way to hell
The Covid Vaccine IS the Mark of the Beast
https://www.bitchute.com/video/XVmrJwwqEegS/
#vaccinescam due to the #virusscam
ARE “VACCINATED” BODIES EMITTING #BLUETOOTH #MAC #ADDRESS SIGNALS ? ( #WICKED TRUTHS)
can they kill via the bluetooth connection that they have injected into 5 billion or so humans
not to mention all the animals
just what is the plan they have
as they play with their new tech toys
https://archive.org/details/john-f-kennedy-american-newspaper-publishers-association
WikiLeaks 'tweets' Kennedy speech on secrecy in 2010:
https://phys.org/news/2010-12-wikileaks-tweets-kennedy-speech-secrecy.html
"The very word ' #secrecy' is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths and secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it. Even today, there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbitrary restrictions. Even today, there is little value in insuring the survival of our nation if our #traditions do not survive with it. And there is very grave danger that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official #censorship and #concealment."
#president #jfk #johnfkennedy #address #press #american-newspaper-publishers-association #27april1961 #history #speech #audio #transcript #news #freespeech #freepress #firstamendment #secrecy #wikileaks #julianassange
test: https://dnsleaktest.com/
https://www.torproject.org/download/
https://firmware.freifunk-ulm.de/
https://openwrt.org/toh/hwdata/tp-link/tp-link_tl-wr1043nd_v4
CHINA: https://openwrt.org/toh/hwdata/tp-link/tp-link_tl-wr1043nd_v4
CHINA: https://openwrt.org/toh/hwdata/tp-link/tp-link_tl-wr1043n_v5
CHINA: Outdoor AP TP-Link CPE210/CPE220 https://openwrt.org/toh/tp-link/cpe210
USA: https://openwrt.org/toh/netgear/r6120
GERMANY: https://openwrt.org/toh/avm/avm_fritz_box_4040
https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/debian-ubuntu/
3.1) auto updates
crontab:
<span style="color: #00ffff;">lsb_release -a</span>; # tested
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)<span style="color: #00ffff;">
su - root</span>
<span style="color: #00ffff;">crontab -e</span>; # will run the update process every night at 3:00 am
<span style="color: #ff6600;">0 3 * * * /scripts/update.sh
</span>
update script:
<span style="color: #00ffff;">vim /scripts/update.sh</span>
<span style="color: #ff6600;">#!/bin/bash
echo "=== attempting automatic daily update on $(date '+%Y-%m-%d-%H:%M:%S') ===" >> /scripts/update.sh.log
apt update >> /scripts/update.sh.log
apt -y upgrade >> /scripts/update.sh.log
apt -y autoremove
echo "=== fine ===" >> /scripts/update.sh.log
echo "" >> /scripts/update.sh.log
</span>
<span style="color: #00ffff;">vim /etc/tor/torrc</span>
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
<span style="color: #ff6600;">SocksPort 0</span>
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
<span style="color: #ff6600;">Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log</span>
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
# Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
<span style="color: #ff6600;">Nickname NICKNAMEOFTHETORNODE</span>
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
<span style="color: #ff6600;">RelayBandwidthRate 5000 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
RelayBandwidthBurst 7000 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)</span>
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
<span style="color: #ff6600;">AccountingMax 400 GB</span>
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
<span style="color: #ff6600;">AccountingStart day 00:00</span>
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
<span style="color: #ff6600;">ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF user <privacy@yourdomain.com></span>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
<span style="color: #ff6600;">ExitPolicy reject *:*</span> # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
<span style="color: #ff6600;">BridgeRelay 1</span>
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like <a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/">https://bridges.torproject.org/</a>. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0
search the user’s tor node here: (if BridgeRelay 1) https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html
it has nice graph that shows bandwidth usage etc.
https://tb-manual.torproject.org/bridges/
https://mastodon.social/@torproject
#linux #gnu #gnulinux #opensource #administration #sysops #tor #vpn #privacy #dns #howto #surveillance #1984
Originally posted at: https://dwaves.de/2022/03/31/wie-privatsphare-online-verbessern-mit-tor-und-kostenloser-vpn-firmware-fur-router-how-to-protect-privacy-online-with-tor-and-free-vpn-firmware-for-routers-how-to-setup-tor-node-%d0%ba%d0%b0/
Spreadable is a decentralized network mechanism. You can use it to combine servers in a public or private network for any purpose.
https://github.com/ortexx/spreadable/
#node #address #network #server #github #client #constant #decentralized