#737max

anonymiss@despora.de

#NTSB Asks For Urgent Safety Checks On #Boeing 737 Rudder System

Source: markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/ntsb-asks-for-urgent-safety-checks-on-boeing-737-rudder-system-1033803177

The warning has been given to Boeing and the Federal #Aviation Administration or #FAA in response to the potential for a jammed or restricted rudder control system on some B-737NG and #737MAX airplanes. These systems were supplied by component manufacturer Collins Aerospace.

#plane #airplane #economy #safety #security #Problem #USA #news

anonymiss@despora.de

F.A.A. #Audit of #Boeing’s #737Max Production Found Dozens of Issues

The company failed 33 of 89 audits during an examination conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration after a panel blew off an Alaska Airlines jet in January.

The F.A.A. also conducted 13 product audits for the part of the inquiry that focused on #SpiritAeroSystems, which makes the fuselage, or body, of the 737 Max. Six of those audits resulted in passing grades, and seven resulted in failing ones, the presentation said.

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/11/us/politics/faa-audit-boeing-737-max.html

#faa #security #flight #airline #fail #problem #economy #news #politics #qa

waynerad@diasp.org

I was going to skip commenting on the Boeing 737-Max fuselage door blowout, but I decided to make some comments after all. I think I can legitimately collect an "I told you so" on this one. The reason is in 2019 when the MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) crashes happened, I did a lot of investigation, including watching Congressional testimony, studying a book on preventing mistakes (Sidney Dekker's "Field Guide to Understanding 'Human Error'"), with many examples from the aviation industry, and investigating the culture of Boeing itself to see how it compared with the "blame the process culture" vs "blame the person" culture discussed in the book. I have an interest in mistakes because I've gotten in trouble for making mistakes. People say, "It's ok to make mistakes," but it's definitely not.

In the interest of brevity, I won't rehash all that here. Just to quickly summarize: What I discovered is that when Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged, the management of McDonnell Douglas came out on top -- they succeeded in making themselves the management of the combined company. Unfortunately, the leadership of McDonnell Douglas was finance-focused, not engineering-focused, like the leadership of Boeing had been since its founding. Once the McDonnell Douglas people came to be in charge of Boeing, they cranked up the pressure to cut corners to increase profits.

In spite of this, a CEO with an engineering background, from Boeing's military side, had managed to get into the CEO position (Dennis Muilenburg). He was CEO at the time of the MCAS crashes. Boeing ousted him and put in the current CEO, a guy with a background in (you guessed it) private equity finance (Dave Calhoun).

I had no way of predicting this specific mishap would occur, which apparently relates to bolts on a "plug" door (it serves as a placeholder for a door to be installed later if there is a need for an additional exit). The specific details are not my point here today. What I could predict is that Boeing would continue to have quality control issues and that more mishaps would occur. I said Boeing would have been better off leaving their current CEO in place, despite the MCAS accidents happening on his watch. He made public commitments to improve safety, as did his replacement CEO with the private equity finance background, but the difference is that his public commitments to safety were more credible due to his engineering background. Boeing did the wrong thing by ousting him and replacing him with a finance guy and I predicted more mishaps would occur.

It saddens me to say this but my prediction going forward is more of the same. There will be more quality control problems, and more mishaps, and hopefully not too many crashes where people die.

Full interview: Former Boeing manager turned whistleblower Ed Pierson - KIRO 7 News

#mistakes #aviation #boeing #737max

wazoox@diasp.eu

WTF are Boeing and the FAA doing, seriously? Don't fly on a #737max !

#airplanes #Boeing

"Boeing wants FAA to exempt MAX 7 from safety rules to get it in the air":
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-wants-faa-to-exempt-max-7-from-safety-rules-to-get-it-in-the-air/

Alaska airlines grounds its 737MAX9 after one loses a part of the fuselage in flight:
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/05/business/alaska-airlines-flight-portland-landing.html

"Boeing Urges Airlines to Inspect 737 Max Planes for Possible Loose Bolts":
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/business/boeing-737-max-faa-inspections.html

"Unsafe at any speed", rings a bell? Is latest Boeing plane unsafe at any altitude?

deutschewelle@squeet.me

Boeing stellt Zukunft von 737 Max infrage | DW | 08.07.2022

Dem US-Flugzeugbauer droht mit seiner Modellserie 737 Max eine neue Krise. Die US-Behörden haben die größte Version der Baureihe, die 737 Max 10, noch immer nicht zugelassen und die Frist dafür läuft im Dezember aus.#Boeing #DaveCalhoun #737Max #Airbus #A321neo
Boeing stellt Zukunft von 737 Max infrage | DW | 08.07.2022

deutschewelle@squeet.me

Boeing stellt Zukunft von 737 Max infrage | DW | 08.07.2022

Dem US-Flugzeugbauer droht mit seiner Modellserie 737 Max eine neue Krise. Die US-Behörden haben die größte Version der Baureihe, die 737 Max 10, noch immer nicht zugelassen und die Frist dafür läuft im Dezember aus.#Boeing #DaveCalhoun #737Max #Airbus #A321neo
Boeing stellt Zukunft von 737 Max infrage | DW | 08.07.2022

deutschewelle@squeet.me

Indonesien erlaubt Comeback der 737 MAX | DW | 28.12.2021

Drei Jahre sind seit dem Absturz einer 737 MAX der indonesischen Lion Air vergangen. Ein weltweites Startverbot für diese Boeing-Jets war die Folge. Mittlerweile dürfen sie wieder fliegen - jetzt auch in Indonesien.#Indonesien #Boeing #737MAX #Garuda #LionAir #PK-LQP #JT610
Indonesien erlaubt Comeback der 737 MAX | DW | 28.12.2021

dredmorbius@joindiaspora.com

In the frame of Moralising Pathology, what went wrong at Boeing?

"Boeing’s 737 Max Is a Saga of Capitalism Gone Awry":

... What made the crashes so vexing is that it was impossible to pin the blame on one central villain. Instead, the whole company seemed to be at fault. Time and again, Boeing executives and engineers didn’t take warning signs seriously enough, opted against adopting additional precautions and made decisions for the sake of saving money or raising profits. ...

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/sunday-review/boeing-737-max.html

In this case, maybe, morality is to blame. There were individual technical, regulatory, design, and management errors, yes, but the common underlying cause is a fundamental misalignment of moral values. Of engineering excellence and passenger responsibility versus short term profits, bonuses, and above all, Milton Friedman's murderous bugbear, "shareholder value".

Or was it just short-sightedness, short-term thinking, denial, and scapegoating?

See previously: Treating systemic problems as moral failings … is why California is on fire.

#boeing #737max #MoralisingPathology #CorporateCulture #ShareholderValue #EngineeringDriven #ShortTermism #ShortSightedness #risk #trust #RegulatoryCapture #blame #denial #scapegoating #distributedResponsibility #BigProblems #ethics #morals #MiltonFriedman #JackWelch #DennisMuilenburg #HarryStonecipher #DaveCalhoun