#al-assad

olladij@diaspora.permutationsofchaos.com

»Die Rettung des Regimes von Baschar #al-Assad hat es #Russland ermöglicht, sich weltweit mit Nachdruck als Beschützer und Retter von Kriminellen aller Art zu empfehlen«, schreibt Gabidullin. Wagners Söldner spielen auch im #Sudan, in #Mali und #Libyen eine Rolle.
#Putin selbst sagte im Februar: »Was #Wagner angeht, habe ich schon gesagt, dass der russische #Staat damit nichts zu tun hat.« Solche Firmen verfolgten kommerzielle Interessen. »Sie verhandeln dort selbst, die örtlichen Machthaber laden sie auf staatlicher Ebene ein und danken ihnen für die geleistete Arbeit«, meinte er mit Blick auf Mali.

https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/ein-soeldner-der-gruppe-wagner-packt-aus/ #krieg #militär #ukraine #syrien #nazis #bücher #politik #kreml #is

olladij_tudajev@joindiaspora.com

some sane analysis

One of the main reasons why wars can turn out badly, even when they have been launched with confidence, is underestimation of the enemy. The sort of optimism bias that leads to predictions of early victory depends on assumptions of a decadent and witless opponent, ready to capitulate at the first whiff of danger. #Putin’s unhinged rant of a speech on Monday and his subsequent statements along with those from his courtiers have helped us understand not only his preferred rationale for war but also why he thinks he can win. If it is the case, as Putin has consistently claimed, that #Ukraine is a non-state, an artificial creation, with a #government that is illegitimate and controlled by #Nazis, then it would not be surprising if he also supposed that ordinary Ukrainians would not fight hard for such an entity. They might even, as the Russian Ambassador to the #UN suggested, greet the incoming Russian forces as liberators.

Coupled with an underestimation of enemy forces can come an overestimation of one’s own. Putin has by and large done well from his wars. He gained the Presidency in 2000 using the Second Chechen #War to demonstrate his leadership qualities. He bloodied #Georgia in 2008 to warn it off joining #NATO and eliminating the separatist enclaves Russia had already established there. He extracted #Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and more recently successfully supported Bashar #al-Assad in #Syria’s civil war. Yet his most recent military enterprises have not involved substantial ground forces being deployed. In Ukraine the operations, including the annexation of Crimea, were largely run by special forces, along with the militias recruited by the separatists in the #Donbas. Only briefly, when the separatists looked like they might be defeated in the summer of 2014 did Putin send in regular forces, who routed the unprepared and still amateurish Ukrainian units. In Syria the Russians provided the airpower but not the infantry.

Their experience of large-scale ground operations is therefore limited.

https://samf.substack.com/p/a-reckless-gamble?utm_source=url